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PANEL DISCUSSION*
Professor Swan: I think we are ready to begin this afternoon's session. Our procedure is going to be kept fairly informal.
The way I think we should start is to allow individual panel members to make any comments they choose based upon this morning's
presentations. If that develops into some interesting things, and if
the discussion becomes focused, we will keep with it. Otherwise,
the chair will exercise the prerogative of moving to the floor for
questions. So, with that we will start. Mr. Giuliani, would you like
to begin?
Mr. Giuliani: Yes. The question that came up in my mind,
while I was listening to other presentations, was this whole notion
that the process of determining asylum was not, or should not be,
political-although I'm not sure that I know what is meant by "political." Of course it would have to be political. You have to determine whether someone has a "well-founded fear of persecution"1 in
a foreign country. That means that to decide responsibly, you must
assess the conditions within that country. You should presume in
favor of the institution of your government empowered with the
responsibility of carrying out that mission, namely the State
Department.
The impression that I was left with, that somehow the State
Department should have no role in this or should have a much
smaller role in this, cannot go unchallenged. The State Department is, institutionally, our eyes and ears in the rest of the world.
You must put heavy emphasis on what it reports about conditions
within a foreign country.
The question of how you would handle a communist government or, let's say, an enemy government, as opposed to one with
which we have diplomatic relations, is also important. Of course,
all of these cases have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Nev* The panelists were Professor Barry R. Chiswick, Rudolph W. Giuliani, James J.

Orlow, Michael H. Posner, and Professor John A. Scanlan. The moderator was Professor
Alan C. Swan.
The tape recording of the discussion was transcribed verbatim; however, to facilitate
reader comprehension, members of the University of Miami Law Review edited the
transcript. The changes made were stylistic and grammatical in nature, and the staff
conscientiously attempted to retain the flavor of the discussion as it occurred.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA") § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (Supp. V 1981).
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ertheless, it is very difficult to determine whether people will be
persecuted if you are returning them to a country with which you
have no relations or to an enemy government with which you cannot work out agreements, so that you cannot trace people who are
returned.
On the other hand, we concluded an agreement with the Haitian government before interdiction went into effect. The government of Haiti gave us the right to follow what happened to people
who were to be returned. That in fact has occurred with regard to
people who have been interdicted. That is also possible to do with
a government, although it may be authoritarian or totalitarian, if
we have diplomatic relations with it. Therefore, we have State Department officers who can do things like trace people when they
return. You can't conclude that type of agreement with a government if you don't have diplomatic relations with it.
This is not, by any means, the whole answer to whether someone is granted asylum. But it certainly is a factor that has to weigh
heavily in deciding whether to grant asylum in a particular case.
Assume that the facts do not suggest that a person fears persecution upon return, and, at the same time, that you have the ability
to follow that person when he returns, and that in fact that government agrees to permit you to follow people upon return. This
scenario makes a pretty powerful case for no real basis for political
asylum. When you look at it in the context of a government with
which we do not have diplomatic relations, then it becomes much
more difficult, and it's a much blinder decision whether to return
someone to that country.
We have granted asylum to people from Haiti. We have denied asylum to people from governments with which we do not
have diplomatic relationships, because it has to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. You can't oversimplify. Nonetheless, these are
factors that must be considered.
If what is meant by "political decision" is partisan politics, I
agree, obviously, that it should play no role. But if what is meant
by politics is politics in the broadest sense, assessing what the situation is within another country, assessing what our own relations
with that nation are, then it would be unrealistic, and basically
silly, to disregard all of these facts.
Professor Scanlan: I think there are probably a number of
us here who would have something to say about that. I don't think
we would have to worry too much about keeping the conversation
going. [Laughter] So, I'll just take my small piece and then let
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somebody else pick up with it.
A distinction that perhaps wasn't made as clearly by anybody
this morning as it might have been, is the one between the Immigration and Nationality Act section 207,2 refugee allocation process, and sections 2088 and 243(h)' combined; and I know that Jim
Orlow has some questions about that combination. Nevertheless, I
would regard section 208 as the political asylum provision of the
Refugee Act of 1980,' which also includes the withholding and deportation provisions. When we're talking about section 207-where
the numbers came up this morning-you're talking about deciding
to bring, usually from a third country (intermediate country of
first asylum), x number of people who are by definition (since that
is what section 207 requires) refugees, who are defined as such
under section 101(a)(42). 6
Being a refugee in Ethiopia, or in Somalia, or in the Sudan, or
in Costa Rica, or anyplace else where refugees find themselves,
does not under American law give anybody a right of entry into the
United States. All that the law provides is membership in a particular category of people who are potential entrants if, in the President's consideration of the national interest, he decides that we
ought to take x number of people from one of these particular
countries. So if we have an allocation of 100,000 people from IndoChina, 21,000 from Russia, or 9,000 people from Eastern Europe,
then of course we're dealing with very broadly defined political
considerations. There is no question about that. The President is
determining what is in the national interest. He is choosing among
a large group of people who might want to come to the United
States, and there are a lot of political factors that enter into that
sort of decisionmaking. I am concerned about the way in which we
have made those political decisions, but I would certainly not want
to suggest that we conceivably could get away from the political
element.
2. INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (Supp. V. 1981) (added by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103).
3. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. V. 1981) (added by the Refugee Act of 1980), Pub.
L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105).
4. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V 1981) (as amended by the Refugee Act of
1980), Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107).
5. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and
22 U.S.C.) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163).
6. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1011(a)(42) (Supp. V 1981) (as amended by the Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 103).
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Contrast that, however, with what happens under INA sections 208 and 243(h). Under section 243(h), there is a mandatory,
not discretionary, requirement that we shall not return individuals
to countries where there is genuine reason to believe that they will
be persecuted for any of the definitional reasons if they are in fact
returned. When we're talking about that sort of mandatory requirement, we are talking about the administrative agencies that
are empowered to make those determinations and about giving the
individuals concerned some minimal level of due process. When
we're talking about giving people due process, we're not talking
about whether under some conceivable system the State Department could trace everybody who has been sent back to Haiti, or El
Salvador, or Guatemala, or what have you, or act as a sort of
United States representative abroad, or make sure that their rights
were not being trampled on. Instead, we're talking about individuals' well-founded fear of persecution for any of a number of stated
reasons. That well-founded fear of persecution, according to the
international standard, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol' is initially a subjective concern. But it is one that the adjudicator is going to evaluate by also taking objective facts into account.
In other words, first we ask, "Is this person telling the truth when
he says, 'I'm scared to death that if I return to Haiti, I'm going to
be shot or imprisoned'?" If the person is not that frightened,
there's no reason at all to withhold deportation. If that person is
that frightened, then under the statute we can't send that person
back.
How do we know? One way is by making guesses, if you like,
but well-informed guesses about whether the story that we are
hearing jibes with what we can ascertain about the conditions in
the country to which a person might be sent. The question then
becomes, "Is the State Department-which is going to want to
maintain certain types of relations with particular countries-going to be willing to go to the wall and say, 'Gee, it is likely
that Iran is going to shoot all of the Bahais'?" 9 I think the answer
clearly is that the State Department is not institutionally qualified
7. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The
United States is not a party to this convention.
8.Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
9. Professor Scanlan refers to the adherents of Bahaism, a religious sect founded in
Iran in the nineteenth century. The regime of Ayatollah Khomeini has intensified the discrimination against the Bahai into actual persecution.
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to make that sort of judgment. So I think that at least in the section 208 and 243(h) areas, that is the argument about getting the
State Department out.
Mr. Orlow: Two comments: First, I guess I'm now going to
return to my regular daily work as a guy who runs around with a
little brown book and quotes the statute. I wish that section 243(h)
were as mandatory as you say it is. I don't think the statute says
that today, although it once did. There is today a lot of fact-finding discretion within the Immigration Service to decide section
243(h) matters-a discretion that previously didn't exist.
What my experience helps me focus on is the search for legitimacy in decisionmaking and the attempt to legalize it, or
proceduralize it, or "statutalize" it, or whatever and, therefore, to
somehow make the decision process easier for the decisionmakers.
If I were a judge-and I don't think that I could ever be a judge-I
would want to know that I'm helping execute a system that has a
greater moral claim than my own judgments and that I don't have
to feel morally responsible for a mistake in judgment that is systematic. If I'm doing what the system tells me, then, automatically,
I'm doing justice, even if the system happens to have told me to do
a thing that I don't particularly like. I've had judges do that. They
have said, "Look, don't complain to me, this is the law, complain
to the Congress; all I'm doing is what they told me to do." Now
that's an easier judgment than one made on political grounds.
If I make a political judgment, then in many ways I am morally accountable for each decision, and it's harder. By making the
judgment "legitimate, legal, in conformity with due process"-whatever that system is-we can escape the discomfort of
measuring another human being's future life, which is something I
personally would find very difficult to do. I don't want to do that,
and I don't imagine other people are comfortable with that role
either. If we legitimate the system, we're not acting in a political
manner; rather, we're administering a fair, legal, orderly, proper,
due process system. But, when you try to put what is political in
the broadest sense into that system, you skew it, and you can't
expect the system to function comfortably. That doesn't change
the nature of the process. It is a political decision. The problem is
trying to accommodate immigration policy in the broader sense, as
well as the asylum policy and refugees-because asylum and refugees are really a smaller part of a larger picture, although in South
Florida it seems to be a dominant theme-trying to accommodate
these kinds of policy decisions in the broader political sense, and
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even in the context of partisan political decisions. Let's say the
people who elect me to Congress are from an area where cheap
labor is needed, and I want to get it for them because that's what
they sent me there to do. There's nothing wrong with that in the
democratic process. But in trying to put those kinds of decisions
into an administrative system, where people are supposed to be
more or less equal, you're skewing the system. I suggest that it's
because the deciders want to have the sense of security (personally,
morally, politically, whatever) that they're doing the right, fair,
and just thing, and not merely making ad hoc decisions with which
they are uncomfortable and which they will ignore after the fact.
My second comment is that when a Haitian or anyone else
making an asylum claim tells me truthfully and honestly that he
believes, "I'm gonna get hurt if I go back"-he must also prove
that that will happen. His honest, subjective fears are not the legal
predicate for a claim. It's enough to justify feeling sorry for him,
perhaps, but he's got to prove also that it's real.
There's a middle-ground position that the State Department
once adopted. Apparently, it has a quasi-legitimate basis, although
the basis may be less legitimate since the 1980 amendments. 10
That is, you used to get letters back from the Immigration Service,
based on a State Department recommendation, stating, "Now
don't grant him asylum, give him an extension of long-term voluntary departure and all the remedies that go with it. Don't grant
him de jure asylum, grant him de facto asylum." That's a legal
status. The problem with this approach today is that if he is
granted de jure asylum, a year later it could ripen into permanent
residence. De facto asylum may or may not ripen into anything.
But if he's really a refugee, then what he's entitled to under international law is sanctuary, and de facto asylum gives that to him.
Now that may be a way of reconciling a State Department need to
have a flexible foreign policy with a humane approach to dealing
with individual human beings.
Mr. Posner: I just want to comment briefly on Mr. Giuliani's
discussion of what we mean by political considerations in the system. First, I think it's true, as Professor Scanlan pointed out, that
the Administration and the Congress have a perfect right to make
whatever decisions they want with regard to the regular admission
process under section 207. I may disagree with their decision-and
10. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C.).
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I do disagree with the way the numbers have been allocated the
last three years-but that's my right. It's quite another thing, however, when we start talking about the domestic asylum situation.
When we say political, what we mean is politically biased.
Nobody would ever suggest that the State Department doesn't
have useful information about particular countries. They certainly
do. But it's biased information, and it covers a number of objectives, one of which is to get facts in front of an immigration judge.
The State Department exists to carry out the foreign policy of the
United States. That foreign policy may or may not be consistent
with making a particular decision in an individual case of an asylum seeker.
There is a practice in the State Department that I like to call
"clientism." It tends to take place with whomever gets appointed
to these positions. When somebody becomes a desk officer or ambassador to country X, they tend to take on their problems with a
very defensive tone. I can think of a dozen instances in the past
several years-where we've gone in with cases from Pakistan,
Chile, the Philippines and Argentina-where the desk officers have
actually said to me, "Your client probably has a good claim for
asylum. Nevertheless, I have another objective. That is to say, I
don't want to embarrass the government of Argentina or the government of the Philippines by granting this prominent dissident
asylum in the United States. So I'm going to look for a way to
avoid it." Now, that to me is political bias, and it's unacceptable. I
think it is reflected in the statistics. Last year, two people from El
Salvador were granted political asylum in the United States, and
neither you nor anybody else in this government is going to convince me that, today, there aren't at least three people from El
Salvador roaming around the United States who have a legitimate
claim for asylum. The statistics just don't make sense. The numbers for Haitians were five last year and two in 1980. As long as
those statistics stay the way they are, I'm going to keep believing
that the system is politically biased.
Second, I think that our capacity to monitor a given situation
can be a factor in evaluating claims for asylum. But I think it's not
really what we're looking for. We're looking at an objective standard-whether somebody has a well-founded fear of persecution.
The fact that the government of Haiti will make a promise to let
American embassy people poke around in their country to look for
returnees, is to me, not a very satisfying promise. I don't think our
embassy has the capacity or the personnel to monitor the wherea-
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bouts of thousands of people whom we intend to send back. I don't
think the government of Haiti is sincere in making that promise. I
certainly don't think that in a country like Guatemala or El Salvador, where violence is pervasive, our embassy people would have
the stupidity to run around in areas not controlled by the government-where there's fighting going on-to try to make those sorts
of evaluations. It is true that to the extent the United States has
some influence over those countries, we may have some minor impact in preventing persecution in some cases. That's as far as I
think we can take that point. Other than that, I think we must
look to objective standards. We are nowhere near that now, and
until we get there, the claims of political bias are going to continue.
Professor Chiswick: It seems to me that whenever you
make decisions regarding refugee status, you are making political
decisions, and we should recognize that they are political decisions.
The question that has to be asked is how many State Departments
should we have-one or two? Presumably, we want to have one
State Department and one foreign policy-although, apparently,
many administrations have had six or seven foreign policies running simultaneously. But that is often not to our advantage. Adding an extra element, having a party other than the State Department making foreign policy decisions and deciding whether a
person has a well-founded fear of political persecution, makes foreign policy more complex and much more difficult. I would be
much more sympathetic to the view of other agencies making these
decisions, if the United States were the only other place in the
world. Suppose we are talking about a world with only two countries, the United States and X. We want to have good relations
with X, so the State Department doesn't want to say that X is
repressive. What do you do when people from X show up on your
shores? I think it's a much more difficult problem to handle when
the United States is the only other place in the world. But we're
not the only other place in the world, and we should not feel that if
we don't take in these individuals, they necessarily are being condemned to return to where they came from and to suffer all sorts
of dire consequences.
Professor Scanlan: Two points: One state department or
two or three or four or however many we're interested in having-the State Department makes a foreign policy for particular
reasons. The Refugee Act-at least the sections I have alluded
to-protects the safety of individuals. The State Department does
not work in a vacuum. Other countries, in determining who is enti-
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tied to political asylum, have had absolutely no difficulty creating
independent bodies to make that determination. In fact, I've heard
that these countries take advantage of the fact that their diplomatic service can disclaim the craziness of the body that granted
asylum, saying, "Gee, we're not responsible for that. We know that
we keep out bad guys, but it was the immigration board that did
it."-That is a nice system. It's even nicer if the UNHCR [United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] is involved, because
then we can blame it on the United Nations, which is a very popular game in the United States..
Mr. Posner: I just have one footnote to Professor Chiswick's
comment. One of the things that we're talking about here is people
who are outside the United States. For people who have already
arrived illegally, however, the question is, should we send them
back? A third option is to send them to some third place, and I'm
not rejecting that idea. In other words, the requirement that I
think we're trying to uphold, the legal requirement, is that they
not be returned to persecution. If the United States determines
that somebody is in fact a refugee or is entitled to asylum or to
"non-refoulement," and if the United States wants to send them to
Canada or France or wherever and those governments agree, you
may do that without violating our obligations. But that's often not
a possibility.
Professor Scanlan: I had a second point, which is the "infinite" capacity of other countries to take in people who are seeking
political asylum. It's an interesting argument because we tend to
use it the other way when we're talking about how generous we are
and how we take in more refugees than everybody else in the world
put together. When we don't want refugees, however, we say that
the rest of the countries in the world are just waiting to take them
in.
Nevertheless, I think that we can visualize this in somewhat
more concrete terms. I have certain reservations about a long-term
commitment to taking in Indo-Chinese at 100,000 a year or at
168,000 a year or at whatever figure we're talking about, simply
because we are bringing people who are halfway around the world
and who have not been part, until quite recently, of the larger cultural universe. If we're talking about a political process here, the
Indo-Chinese are not very closely associated with that, and we are
then talking about making hard decisions about how many refugees to admit. I suppose one could argue that it's a regional problem, rather than necessarily one that the United States alone
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ought to be addressing. On the other hand, I think that frequently
the refugees that we want to disavow are the refugees for which we
have created a tradition of acceptance. It's very interesting that we
are so terribly upset about the admission of Cubans to the United
States right now, when we have had such a tremendous amount to
do with creating that particular expectation and that particular
problem-not beginning in 1959, but beginning when we took
Cuba as a possession and established cultural ties between Cuba
and the United States. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense to visualize that there are lots of countries in the world, other than ourselves, that would rather have the Cubans. That doesn't necessarily mean that we want them. But I don't think that we can take
refuge in the abstraction that there are other countries out there
that would be more likely to take them.
Professor Swan: May I make just a statement of criticism-this criticism, in fact, was running through most of this
morning's session-in terms of the uses of section 207 authority of
the President to admit large groups of people whom he wants to
admit for any number of purposes. At least since World War II,
presidents and people who conduct our foreign policy have found it
necessary-perhaps for foreign policy reasons or domestic policy
reasons-to bring these groups in. Yet there seems to be an undercurrent that there has been a high order of illegitimacy, irrationality, or unfairness, in the way that this authority has been exercised, and yet it is a policy, too. How would you address-in the
context of any new legislation-standards, if you need standards,
by which this process would be exercised, if indeed it has been perceived as not being used legitimately over the last thirty years?
Mr. Posner: One practical approach, of course, is to have
Congress take an active role in the consultation. The way the process works now, the State and Justice Departments come up with a
figure in the middle of September, and they say, "In two days this
is what we're going to do." The Congress sits there and says
"Okay!" Ideally, I think we ought to have a process in which the
administration comes in six months ahead of time, holds open
hearings on the various needs of various groups and creates a kind
of advisory board. The board would, as one of its functions, evaluate the figures independently, consulting with both the State Department and the Justice Department and anybody else in the government who is interested. It also would look to what the United
Nations and the voluntary agencies say as to what the worst needs
of these groups are.
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I think we must remember that when the Refugee Act was
passed, we talked about a national entrance, and we talked about a
humanitarian concern. Both factors have to go into decisionmaking. It doesn't mean that it's not a political decision; it doesn't
mean we don't look to our national interest; it doesn't mean the
President can't award a certain number of slots to Eastern Europeans if we want to make a point politically. But it does mean that
we must be a little bit more humane and a little bit fairer about
the process. Therefore, I think the more we open it up to discussion today, the more that's likely to happen.
Professor Chiswick: I'd like to return to the area that Mr.
Orlow introduced earlier, about the Immigration Service and its
budget and how it allocates its resources. He's more charitable
than I would be. It is not just a question of an Immigration Service
being starved for resources-a meager budget-but an Immigration Service that has been very badly administered. The employees
within the Immigration Service may be, and probably are, very
hard-working, dedicated people. But there has been I think a lack
of will and a lack of aggressive administration by the Service's
high-level administrators. We're not talking about the current
commissioner-he just arrived. You see it if you look at the way
resources are allocated within the INS and at the INS's lack of
aggressiveness in battling for resources with the Justice Department and the Office of Management and Budget. If you look at
dollars devoted to enforcement, what you see is that there has been
a relative shift in funds and emphasis to the border patrol. That's
very good if your objective is to get a larger number of apprehensions per dollar, but that may be a disastrous policy if the objective
is deterrence or reducing the number of illegal aliens in this country who have used the border as a revolving door.
We talk about a million apprehensions per year, but we don't
know whether that figure means 100,000 people apprehended on
the average ten times, or 500,000 people apprehended on the average twice, or 1,000,000 people apprehended on the average only
once. That's a very basic kind of information, which would be extremely helpful to the planning of enforcement operations. But the
Immigration Service has been starved for resources, in terms of its
research effort, and in terms of its gathering of statistics. The annual reports are always at least two years out of date. Now, something that at least most government agencies can do timely is producing descriptive data.
The decline in real resources devoted to interior enforcement
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has been a very serious problem, because the emphasis on the border may have no effect on deterrence. You arrest somebody, you
throw him across the border-chalk one up for an apprehension.
Three nights later when he comes across again, you will apprehend
him again-chalk up a second apprehension. The third time, he
sneaks through. When he is apprehended in the interior and sent
back, he has incurred costs getting into the interior and getting
established; to go through that process again is more costly for the
alien than simply trying to run across the border again the next
night.
Also, nobody talks about penalties for apprehended illegal
aliens, other than the penalty that is used now, deportation. I
guess I've never understood the strong interest in employer sanctions. I suspect that's a way of saying, "The federal government
really doesn't want to handle this situation for a variety of reasons.
Let's put the blame on employers." There has also been a drift
over the last couple of decades, not just towards federal government intervention in many more activities, but also towards placing greater burdens on employers. Now, what will happen with employer sanctions is a kind of affirmative-action-type program, but
the other way around: Employers will have to demonstrate affirmatively that they made efforts not to hire illegal aliens.
We did a survey of employers of apprehended illegal aliens, 1 '
and found that a large number of them thought that by employing
illegal aliens they were violating the law. They weren't, but that
was what they thought. They thought the law had no teeth, so they
violated it as, pardon my saying it, most of us may be apt to do.
For employer sanctions to have any impact, there will have to be
definite regulations and some means by which employers can determine whether the person has a legal right to work in this country. I find it surprising that an administration committed to reducing paper work and regulations wants to enter into a process that
will necessarily result in far more bureaucratic intervention into
everyday lives. Of course, it simply may not intend to have the law
enforced, in which case you get the law on the books and then
don't worry about enforcing it, making either everybody happy or
everybody unhappy.
Let me read some numbers about the Immigration Service.
11. B.

CHISWICK
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The number of permanent positions in the Service increased by
nearly sixty percent from 1960 to 1979, a twenty-year period. During the same period, the annual number of immigrants that had to
be processed more than doubled. Nonimmigrant admissions of
aliens, tourists, students, et cetera increased eightfold, and the
number of illegal alien apprehension increased fourteenfold.
There has been a nice growth in productivity, measured by activities per employee, but it's not clear if it's had much of an effect on
deterrence. For fiscal years 1977 to 1979, the Immigration Service
operating budget increased eleven percent in real dollars (that's
corrected for inflation). That's a big increase! Where did the
money go? Real resources devoted to what's called "service to the
public", "support operation" and "program direction" (that's
mainly headquarters activities) increased forty-seven percent. Border patrol resources increased one percent, but the detention and
deportation resources decreased in real terms four percent, and
what I think is the biting arm of enforcement, interior enforcement
resources, decreased fifteen percent.12
There are three issues involved: First, the level of resources
that the Immigration Service has at its disposal; second, how those
resources are allocated among its enforcement activities; and third,
concerns about what employer sanctions mean. Are they really going to have a "bite," and in what way are they going to be enforced? These are things that we should think about.
Mr. Giuliani: Employer sanctions are probably the single
most vital part of an overall effort to reduce the number of people
who come into this country. You really have to see these things
together. Obviously, no one of them alone can answer the
problems. It's like the problem of drugs coming into the country.
Everybody has their own pet notions about what should be emphasized and what will stop the problem. In fact, there is no one thing
that will stop it. Pressure has to be placed on all of the points at
which people or drugs come into this country. The border patrol
increase is necessary to give us the ability to stop more people
from coming over. This is not going to stop everyone from coming
over, and it certainly will not, by itself, seal our borders. It will
reduce by some amount, however, the numbers coming in.
The employer sanctions will reduce one of the motivations for
coming to the United States. But even if it is illegal to employ
illegal aliens, and if there are monetary fines and the possibility of
12. See 36 U.

MIAMI

L. REv. 893, 910 (1982).
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going to prison, that still will not stop everyone from doing it. It
will stop, however, a certain number from doing it. When you seriously enforce that law, which we would have every intention of doing-there is already a budget allocation for increased interior enforcement if and when Congress passes that legislation, you are
going to reduce the numbers of people who are coming. You are
not going to eliminate the problem; you are not going to wipe it
out. But if you combine an increased border patrol with-employer
sanctions that reduce the motivation, you are going to cut down
the numbers significantly. When you also consider that from at
least one of the countries that is the source of a good deal of the
illegal flow, there will be increased avenues for legal immigration,
we will not, I hope, have the same situation ten years from now
that we have now, a large underground society living among us. All
of these measures together are designed to give us more control
over immigration than we presently have, or at least more than we
had a year ago. Employer sanctions are a very, very important part
of a program to return control over our borders to us.
The legalization program is also important. If we are going to
legalize the status of perhaps millions of people who are here illegally, and put them on the road to citizenship, there is a potential
that the legalization program itself could be an additional incentive for illegal migration. So we better have in place more substantial enforcement and deterrent mechanisms than we have had in
the past. We had none in the past, and we had a border that was
easily crossed by virtually anyone with the slightest bit of ingenuity. We need to have in place measures that (1) control the situation as it existed before amnesty, and (2) are ready to deal with the
problems that amnesty will cause once the existence of it becomes
well-known throughout the world.
Mr. Orlow: This is a perfectly realistic place to return to
Professor Chiswick's point. Right now, the Immigration Service
has a very ambitious I.D. card program, because it is said the old
I.D. cards were too easily forged and altered. Under the old program, an arriving immigrant received his card either upon arrival
at the airport, or within a week or two thereafter (because they
were made up locally), or when he adjusted his status. Now, it
takes six months, and sometimes you can't get a card for two years.
I don't know whether a sanctions program that assumes the viability of an I.D. program is valid, because there is no capability to
staff it. Nor do I believe that an amnesty program that is going to
put three to six million new cases into the system is valid without
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the capability of staffing it. We have a situation in which those
people who come to the Immigration Service say, "I think I'm illegal. I think I have a remedy. I think I can get straightened out."
They can plan, in certain cities, on starting to stand on line at two
or three in the morning and, maybe, be heard the second or third
day, merely to get a blank form. They will be lucky if they get the
right blank form, because the people giving them the forms haven't
been trained. INS personnel have good intentions, but they haven't
been trained.
The kind of budgetary decision that you're describing as essential for enforcement doesn't reflect the parallel side of what to
do when someone wants to be honest and wants to come to you to
straighten out his situation. I have stood in immigration offices in
at least three cities and have seen investigators cringe on an afternoon when people came in to surrender. The investigators had
been at work since six o'clock in the morning. They had just come
back from a raid. They didn't want to see anybody else; they
couldn't see anybody else; they didn't know what to do with the
people. That's just "Alice in Wonderland." It seems to me that
someone has to take hold-and I don't mean to belittle the Service. I don't think it's the fault of anybody who's there now; I
think it's the history of things. I am not saying it is this administration. I'm not even saying it's the previous administration. It's a
long history that goes way back.
Mr. Giuliani: That's a very valid point. For a long time, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service was considered a less than
top priority within the Department of Justice. So when budget decisions were made, the Immigration Service was the place where
you cut your budget. Also, if you compare the position levels in the
Immigration and Naturalization Service with those at almost any
other comparable organization within the Justice Department,
those at INS are undoubtedly much lower. The Attorney General
is well aware of that, and our first complete budget would allocate
a lot more money to upgrading the positions in INS.
The single most important mission of Alan Nelson, the new
Commissioner of the INS, is to straighten out the management of
the Service. There is a whole host of severe management and
budget problems, and they are the product of ten to twelve years
of inattention and of treating immigration as a secondary problem,
while crime, antitrust, and civil rights captivated the attention of
the Justice Department.
Mr. Orlow: If that's true, Rudy-and I think it's more than
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eleven or twelve years, it may be closer to thirty, but in any event
Mr. Giuliani: I'm too young to remember. [Laughter]
Mr. Orlow: I started young. [Laughter] Where is the capability supposed to be for any kind of planning that is longer-ranged
than just the obvious burning management problems? Is that supposed to come out of your Legal Policy Office, or from another
agency-or do we get university people together to do it?
Mr. Giuliani: No, that planning capability is supposed to be
coming out of, in the first instance, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. That is pretty much the job of [INS Acting Deputy
Commissioner] Doris Meissner.1 8 The Office of Legal Policy in the
Justice Department has the same overview type relationship with
the INS as it has, for example, with the FBI and the DEA.
Mr. Orlow: What about long-range substantive policy, as distinct from the procedures to execute?
Mr. Giuliani: Those same two organizations.
Mr. Orlow: That's a change from previous ways that the Immigration Service used to do business. Traditionally, they went up
to the Hill, and when asked what they thought about a particular
substantive piece of legislation, they by-and-large would comment
only on the procedures and cost but not on whether it was good or
bad.
Mr. Giuliani: Well, then it's a change.
Professor Chiswick: I don't know what has happened in
the new administration, but up to the end of the previous administration, the policy, research and analysis unit in the Immigration
Service was essentially "zilch." Are you saying that there has been
a substantial upgrading of that unit?
Mr. Giuliani: There has been a significant upgrading.
Professor Chiswick: Well, that's a big improvement.
Mr. Giuliani: As I stated, INS planning is under the Acting
Deputy Commissioner, and she has put together a staff, and I honestly can't tell you how large it is, but she is very effective. Noticeable improvements will take time, but I am confident they will
occur.
Professor Chiswick: May I make two comments on something that you said? You said that after the sanctions are enacted,
you are going to request more interior enforcement resources. I'm
13. Ms. Meissner now serves as Executive Associate Commissioner of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service.
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not sure why you have to wait until after; that could be done now.
The second comment has to do with incarceration. In none of
the proposals that I've seen regarding illegal aliens, have I come
across anything about the effect of incarcerating for a month apprehended illegal aliens. If they're coming up during a harvest season, an apprehension at the border would be more expensive because they would lose the month by being in some stockade in the
Southwest, rather than trying to return the next night or the night
after.
Mr. Giuliani: Thank you, Barry, you look like a good guy.
Professor Chiswick: You gave me five dollars to set it up.
[Laughter]
Mr. Giuliani: I don't think we should be incarcerating people
for longer than we must. The situation with aliens from Mexico
has been that when they are apprehended and found to have illegal
status (and they are usually found in groups), they're taken to one
of the detention centers in El Paso or San Diego, and then after a
day or two, they voluntarily agree to go back. I don't think it offers
an additional deterrent to hold them for a month or two. The cost
of that to us would be prohibitive.
The other immigration reform elements, a larger border patrol, employer sanctions, an increase in interior enforcement, as
well as legal channels for admission (such as the guest worker program) have all been very, very hotly contested and debated. You
can select any one of the issues, and you can find a total difference
of opinion between two people, and both may have very valid studies supporting their positions.
In terms of the guest worker program, many people say, "We
should not have a guest worker program; it can't work. The bracero
program14 didn't work; therefore, a guest worker program wouldn't
work. They will take jobs from Americans." Of course, labor maintains this position very, very strongly. Then, on the other hand,
you have people who say, "The illegals take jobs Americans will
not perform. For instance, in the Southwest the unemployment
problems aren't the same as they are in other places. We need
these people; they're a vital part of our economy. It's going to con14. The bracero program was authorized by the Act of July 12, 1951, ch. 223, Pub. L.
No. 82-78, 65 Stat. 119 (repealed 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-203, 77 Stat. 363 (1963)). The aim of

the program was to regulate the admission of Mexican nationals into the United States for
temporary agricultural employment, so as not to "adversely affect" the wages and working
conditions of domestic agricultural workers. See generally Dellon, Foreign Agricultural
Workers and the Prevention of Adverse Effects, 17 LAB. L.J. 739 (1966).
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tinue whether you try to stop it or not. Therefore, you should try
to find a way to regulate it." I could probably speculate, based on
prejudices, bias and whatever, as to the right answer, but I don't
really know the answer-I don't think any of us do, and part of the
reason for that is that we have no statistical base from which to
determine what illegal aliens do and don't do. We don't know who
they are; we don't know what jobs they're holding. When we estimate how many of them there are, we hear some people say three
million, while others say six million. We're talking blindly about a
very serious problem.
The theory of the guest worker program, as an experimental or
pilot program, is to see if we can bring in 50,000 workers, as well as
increase the legal flow from Mexico by another 20,000. So actually
it would mean 70,000 workers from Mexico. The program would be
conducted in states that want those workers, and under a regulatory scheme that follows the workers and protects them against
abuse. Assume that we can do this with fifty to seventy thousand
workers, and that it doesn't turn into what the bracero program
was (which was alleged to have resulted in harsh and inhumane
treatment for the people who came), and that the workers don't
displace-to the extent that we can determine the jobs they're taking and the unemployment statistics in those communities-Americans from jobs. Those assumptions will give us facts
from which to rationally decide whether to have a larger guest
worker program, in numbers that I believe Professor Scanlan was
talking about before, numbers that would have an impact on the
problem. The Governor of Texas says that 400,000 people per year
come into Texas to work temporarily, and, therefore, a 50,000-person guest worker program will not work. Or maybe it would work
next year or the year after. But if in fact it works at the fifty to
seventy thousand-worker level in answering these two major questions, then three years from now it could be a larger guest worker
program. But if it doesn't work at the fifty to seventy thousand
level, and they are displacing Americans, or we can't control the
program, then we can abandon the effort. I think it's a rational,
fair way to try to give us facts rather than a lot of speculation and
political debate about such an important issue. It's a very sensible
way to proceed.
Mr. Orlow: Let me ask a question. Take the Mexican situation, both in terms of its proposed increase in numbers, plus its
recaptured unused Canadian numbers (which is a way to get at
even more numbers), and the guest worker program (which is, pre-
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sumably, predominantly Mexican). Are we not going to generate
what I would call a "turnpike effect," given the scale of Mexican
population growth? That is to say, when you plan a turnpike to
handle a certain volume of traffic, pretty soon, as soon as you start
it, there is more traffic than was planned because it is easier to use
the road. Is' there any consideration that by trying to regulate illegal entry, we're in fact encouraging it?
Mr. Giuliani: If the estimates are even generally correct as to
the numbers of people that come in over the southwest border to
work in the United States temporarily, I can't see that we would be
encouraging a process that isn't already pretty much out of hand.
If we can impose order and regulation on it, then we can, for the
good of all involved, avoid a lot of the terrible consequences of
their being in this country illegally. Let's assume that the Governor of Texas and the people in the Southwest are correct, and that
illegal migration does not have a major impact on Americans who
want jobs. Further, assume that the studies are correct and that it
really does benefit our economy to have these people come in.
Then one option is to accept the status quo. A lot of people argue,
"This is a free-market decision that is being made, and it is working itself out." But as a result of the fact that they are here illegally, there are an awful lot of social and legal consequences for us
and for them, such as the lamentable existence of an underground
society beyond the protections of the law. If we can impose some
form of regulation, so that these people are identified, they will
have a status and a right to be here. I think this will eliminate
many of the problems that we presently have in that area of the
country. And we are going to begin the process of reestablishing
order in the way that people come into this country.
Earlier, someone suggested that the Haitians were being used
as an example of maintaining order or of stopping the flow of undocumented people into the country because it is easy to do it with
them. I think that that was a very unfortunate and inaccurate
comment. In any given year, we detain many, many more Mexicans
than we do Haitians. We detain them for shorter periods of time
because they voluntarily elect to go home. If, in fact, we were going
to attempt to demonstrate that we can control the flow of people
into this country, we're going to do it with illegal migrants from
Mexico. We're not going to do it with the Haitians, the Afghans, or
whatever other groups come in, because they enter in much smaller
numbers. The single most important area in which to regain control is along the southwest border. Those are the large numbers.
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When we talk about three to six million people who are in this
country illegally, a significant percentage are Mexican nationals. If
you look at the President's proposals 5 and the Simpson-Mazzoli
bill,le many of the proposed reforms are designed to deal with that
problem-increased border patrol, employer sanctions, increased
interior enforcement, and legal channels to permit temporary admissions so that we can identify them and give them a legal status
in our society.
Audience Member: Mexican leaders have indicated that oil
and gas exports to the United States will be linked to continued,
relaxed enforcement of U.S. immigration policy towards Mexican
aliens. Further, President Reagan has expressed his desire to enlist
Mexico's aid in stemming the threat of communism in Central
America. How would these foreign policy considerations affect any
proposed caps on legal immigration, and how would they influence
U.S. border enforcement policies?
Mr. Giuliani: There is no doubt that Mexico is a close ally
and good friend of the United States. If you look at the package of
policies, you will note a recognition of this, including plans to more
than double the amount of legal immigration from Mexico. I think
that's in our mutual interest. All of the proposals that would relate
to Mexico are proposals that are mutually beneficial to the United
States and to Mexico. However, the Mexican government is not,
publicly at least, in favor of the guest worker program. One theory
is that they feel it would amount to a recognition, maybe, of some
inadequacies in the Mexican economy. They are not in favor of a
guest worker program, whereas the Reagan administration is. So
the proposal was not developed necessarily to curry favor with
Mexico, but was developed to try to solve a problem in a way that
would be mutually beneficial to the United States and to Mexico,
and to direct the flow of people from Mexico through legal channels and away from the illegal ways in which they are coming in
now.
Audience Member: Mr. Giuliani, a few moments ago you
mentioned that the greatest detention problems actually were
Mexicans who were apprehended in the Southwest and who voluntarily agreed to go back, and I take it you were making some com15. Proposed Omnibus Immigration Control Act, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.

S11,992 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
16. Proposed Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REc. S10, 619 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982); H.R. 7357, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REc. H10, 320 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1982).
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parison between those individuals who are here for work and, for
example, Haitian detainees. How can they be compared? The Mexican workers turn right around and come back again; the Haitians
do not. Instead, the Haitians-many of them, I take it-are seeking asylum. Isn't the Mexican situation different from the Haitian
situation in which you detain people who will not volunteer to go
back because they can't just turn around through the revolving
door?
Mr. Giuliani: I wasn't suggesting what you say I was suggesting. What I was saying was that the question whether we're
going to regain control of our borders and assert control over the
immigration process is going to be resolved on the southwest border, not with flows of people from Haiti, Afghanistan, or other
places. The southwest border is the core of our illegal immigration
problem. That was the point I was making. Even the question of
detention, in terms of people who are detained, relates to many
more Mexicans than to Haitians or any other group.
Now, to get to the rest of your question, you're dealing with
two different claims and two different issues. Some Haitians did
want to return voluntarily. Some alleged that they were coerced
into doing that. The judge who had that case appointed a special
master who interviewed them and determined that they were not
coerced, and they were returned voluntarily. Those that do not
want to return voluntarily will have an opportunity to litigate their
claim for asylum. In the case of Mexicans, the numbers may
change, and the proportion changes. There are some Mexicans who
do litigate, but very few. Most decide to go back voluntarily and, I
suspect, thinking, "Well, next year I can come back again."
Professor Chiswick: Not just next year, next week.
Mr. Giuliani: Usually it's near the end of the season.
Audience Member: We have given priority to enter the
United States legally to people from nations like the Soviet Union
or Cuba, as opposed to nations like Haiti. Doesn't our immigration
policy say that this country places a high priority on rights such as
the right to vote or freedom of religion, as opposed to things like
the right to food and shelter?
Professor Scanlan: Yes.
Professor Swan: Yes. I think it's in the statutory standards,
isn't it?
Mr. Orlow: No! It seems to me that what it says is that the
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McCarran amendments in the Internal Security Act of 1950' regulating subversives along with the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952,18 have a built-in, anticommunist bias. If you're coming as
a refugee from a communist country, you're going to get preference. But if you're coming as a refugee from a fascist country, well,
we're a little more friendly with the fascists, so we don't worry too
much about you.
Mr. Posner: I think that your question indicates that you're
falling into what I would call the "diabolical dichotomy" of
[United States Representative to the United Nations] Jeane Kirkpatrick [laughter]: the distinction between authoritarianism and
totalitarianism and the notion that anybody who comes from an
authoritarian country, like Guatemala, is automatically better off
than somebody who comes from a totalitarian state, like Yugoslavia. I don't buy that. I think that there are political problems in
both the dictatorships of the left and of the right; we have a standard for asylum that is an objective political standard of persecution. It is a strict standard. It does not say that we take people
because they are poor. But it does say, "If somebody has a wellfounded fear of persecution, then regardless of where they are
coming from, you have to take them." I would suggest to you that
there are as many people in Guatemala as there are in Hungary or
Romania that fit into that standard.
Audience Member: I have a question that I'd like to address to Mr. Posner, in terms of the diabolical dichotomy of Jeane
Kirkpatrick. I'm worried about the distinction that you seem to be
embracing, which produces a kind of optimism on your part, that
we can focus on an objective distinction between political and economic repression. In other words, there is an unfortunate assumption that poverty is like getting an illness; it's just bad luck. Isn't it
false to say that someone who is suffering from poverty doesn't
have just as much right to a claim of asylum as someone suffering
from other sorts of cataclysms?
Mr. Posner: I don't agree with that. First, I guess I do accept
that it is as desperate a situation to be poor or hungry as it is to be
17. Amendment of Immigration Act of 1918, § 1832, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG. REC.
12,058 (1950) (enacted as amended in the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831,
§§ 22-30, 64 Stat. 987, 1006-18 (repealed 1952)). See generally Wasserman, The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952-Our New Alien and Sedition Law, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 62, 7277 (1953-54).
18. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8

U.S.C.).
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politically persecuted. The law, however, and the historical background that allows us to have what we call a category, a special
category of refugees and asylum, doesn't make that point. It provides a limited definition. I think it's important that we recognize
this. We ought to be considering how we deal with cases of extreme
poverty. We may want to create a future category. We may want to
deal with that group of people, and that's a huge group, as Mr.
Giuliani has said. It's a difficult problem, but I think that we confuse the issue and create problems when we try to define refugee
and asylum other than in the way they are defined by law.
My second point is that the distinctions often do get blurred.
Ira Kurzban raised the point this morning 9 that often when you
talk to somebody about a political or an economic refugee, you're
talking in artificial terms. There is a continuum, and I think that
most people come for a variety of reasons. They have political reasons; they have personal reasons; they have economic reasons.
What we're trying to do is to create a system that is objective to
the extent that it looks to see if the primary motivation to remain
in this country is a well-founded fear of persecution. Those people
who can prove this are the ones that we've decided arbitrarily, on
the basis of this international standard, to protect and to accept
into this country.
Audience Member: I'd like to direct this question to Professor Scanlan and Mr. Giuliani. Has the 1980 Refugee Act failed the
test, and if so, why? How will the Simpson-Mazzoli bill pick up the
pieces?
Professor Scanlan: There are a couple of parts to your
question. Has the Refugee Act failed? In some respects, I think it
has, but not in all. I, for instance, am not horribly distressed by the
way that section 207 works. I think that it could work better if the
allocation process were handled better. But I think there are some
signs that the allocation process was more sophisticated this year
than it ever was in the past. We assume that it probably will become more sophisticated in the future. In other respects, I think
that it failed because it didn't go far enough in visualizing the possible effects of an entry pattern that included a large number of
people seeking refuge in the United States as a country of first
asylum. I mean, obviously, the Mariel boatlift ° suggested that the
19. See 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 876-78 (1982).
20. Professor Scanlan refers to the 100,000-plus refugees who entered the United States
from Cuba in 1980; Mariel was the port from which most of the refugees left Cuba.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:939

Refugee Act did not cover that situation very well. To the extent
that the Cuban and Haitian entrants either filed political asylum
claims or were processed as if they were going to file political asylum claims, it was clear that the Act was rather unwieldy. I'm not
sure how many of the entrants actually filed claims, but let's say
anywhere from sixty to one hundred thousand people. I think it
would probably be closer to sixty thousand. That problem, unfortunately, has continued. As of last count there were, I think, about
106,000 pending asylum claims.
I personally believe that the Simpson-Mazzoli bill does a number of things that will help the situation. For many of the reasons
that we talked about earlier, I'm not sure that it does everything
needed to alleviate the situation. I think, for instance, that entrusting the initial determination to administrative law judges will help.
The independent review board proposed in the Simpson-Mazzoli
bill will help. You still have a problem with clogging up the system
with claims that are very similar on their face but which are nonetheless painstakingly individually examined, learning nothing from
the similarities of other cases. This is one reason why I have advocated, for quite a while, that there be an asylum advisory board,
which would have the capability of producing group profiles. These
profiles would be used when it is clear that all members of a particular group do in fact have at least a prima facie case for asylum.
(The Bahais in Iran are a very good example.) The government
would not be precluded from coming back and saying, "Yes, that
person is a Bahai, but he's also the brother of the prime minister,
and he is not going to be persecuted, or he's a human rights violator himself and is not protected by the Act." The Simpson-Mazzoli
bill is a big improvement on the Refugee Act.
Mr. Giuliani: The 1980 Act removed, as Mr. Posner indicated, the presumption of persecution for those fleeing communist
countries, so that the question of refugee or asylum status has to
be determined objectively, on a case-by-case basis and on the merits, whether you came from a communist country or not.
This is a very big change, and these determinations are going
to be a very difficult thing for government officials to make; it's
going to take a while to see how it all works out. They are very
difficult because you're asking an official of the United States government to evaluate on an equal basis a claim for asylum from a
government that is an enemy of the United States with one that is
not, or, in fact, might be an ally (even though you might disagree
with the policies of that government). It's an interesting policy de-
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cision, that you should allocate places within the United States
equally among your friends and enemies. This is the law, and it
resulted in a dispute between the Justice Department and the
State Department eight or nine months ago, over Indo-China,
which you described before. I'm sure there are going to be other
situations like that because the decisionmaking process goes
against the grain, particularly for those who are in the business of
determining what the best interests of the United States are or
should be. I agree that we must be cautious.
The ultimate authority to decide whether someone is granted
asylum or refugee status rests by law with the Attorney General,
although the initial decisionmaking authority is delegated to the
Commissioner of the INS. But it would be totally unrealistic to say
that the State Department should not play a major role in the input of information used in deciding whether someone should be
granted either one of those two statuses. The State Department is,
in fact, our institutional eyes and ears on the international scene;
they're our institutional evaluators of conditions in foreign governments. Nonetheless, the Justice Department and the Attorney
General ultimately decide who is granted asylum or refugee status.
Obviously, any Attorney General must give heavy weight to the
recommendations, studies and background information supplied
by the State Department. Not to do so would result in the decisionmaking process being even more difficult.
It is too early to tell how well the 1980 Act is working. There is
a conscientious effort within the INS to apply the Act the way it's
written, to do what they are asked to do. We've said a lot of things
about the Immigration and Naturalization Service which suggest
that it doesn't function well, that it's not organized as well as it
should be, and that it doesn't have the resources or the expertise
that it should have. This administration has done much to increase
the services's resources and expertise by putting more money and
more people into INS. During the last two years of the previous
administration, the INS did not even have a commissioner. Now
there is a commissioner. Improvements are going to take a while,
but there is a. real commitment to make them. Although there are
people who have reservations about the wisdom of the 1980 Act,
we are committed to making the difficult decisions mandated by
the Act on a case-by-case basis. It will create a certain tension between the Justice and the State Departments, but that's a healthy
tension because the decisions, in the long run, will be better.
Audience Member: Mr. Orlow, you've indicated that our
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immigration policy is discriminatory. Is a discriminatory policy per

se offensive to everybody in the United States, or do you feel that,
within certain criteria set forth by the program that you proposed,
a discriminatory policy could function?
Mr. Orlow: What I said is that our policy was racially discriminatory until 1965. That was amended out. 21 I believe our pre-

sent aspiration is to have a policy that is neutral as to nationality
and race and, to some degree, as to sex. Do I think that we could
have a discriminatory policy that would serve the United States
well? In one way, we have a very discriminatory policy in terms of
enforcement. The rich get representation, and the poor get
deported.
Audience Member: Should we have a lottery type of system, where everybody files once a year, and 150,000 or whatever
the quota requirement is for that year, win legal entry?
Mr. Orlow: This sounds like a debate that we had in undergraduate school on rushing and getting people into fraternities: Get
the first twelve guys through the door, and then close the door. I
don't know whether what John Scanlan says is right: the numbers
game is a "losery." I have to agree with Rudy Giuliani's premise,
that until we do some statistical studies, we don't know what we've
got. That makes it impossible to give you an answer that I'd be
comfortable with.
Audience Member: So then you would be opposed to a
lottery?
Mr. Orlow: Oh yes.
Audience Member: I hate to digress to this question, but all
of the panelists seem to be very concerned with it. You indicated,
Mr. Giuliani, that you thought it was too early to evaluate what
was happening under the Refugee Act of 1980, but that you apparently thought the regime of the country from which a person was
fleeing would be considered.
Although Congress took out the communist/noncommunist
distinction and instead put in the "well-founded fear of persecution" language, we continue to have this situation where people
coming from certain countries consistently get refugee status because they come from-let's go back to Mr. Posner's use of Jeane
Kirkpatrick's term-a totalitarian rather than an authoritarian
21. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163). See generally Scully, Is the Door Open Again? A
Survey of Our New Immigration Law, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 227 (1966).

19821

PANEL DISCUSSION

country. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Giuliani: What I was indicating was that it is an understandable phenomenon that a person who is an official of this government would have a temptation to decide one way if a refugee
was from a country that was an enemy of the United States, as
opposed to a refugee from a country that was not. I know what the
law says; we try very hard to apply it, and we try very hard to
teach the people at INS how to apply it. But there is a tension
there that you just have to recognize. First, it was done another
way for a long time. It's going to take a while for that to change.
Second, it does go against the grain to say we should rule out and
not consider whether the government from which someone is fleeing is a government that is an avowed enemy of this country, as
opposed to one that is not. You are going to find tensions that develop as a result of that. That is natural, that is a phenomenon
that has occurred already and that is likely to continue to occur in
applying the decisionmaking process under the 1980 Act. If American officials didn't have that kind of tension, I would be troubled.
Audience Member: Professor Scanlan mentioned the
Bahais before, and I have a question related to that for Professor
Scanlan and for Mr. Posner: Clearly, the Bahais have a wellfounded fear of persecution, the Zoroastrans have a well-founded
fear of persecution, as do virtually all the Shi'ites of Iran, virtually
everybody in Ethiopia, everybody in Uganda, as does everybody in
Kampuchia. As a practical matter, what would happen if all of
these people wanted to act on their rights to seek asylum in this
country?
Mr. Posner: I guess the first answer to that is that I'm not
sure that I would be willing to say that every one of those people
you mentioned does have a well-founded fear of persecution. I believe in the system of a case-by-case determination, and my sense
is that the presumption would be that anybody who's a Bahai in
Iran certainly is subject to a good hard look, and ninety-five percent to ninety-nine percent are likely to be people who are going to
have trouble if they go back. Nevertheless, we would have to be
true to the system of evaluating on a case-by-case basis.
The practical answer to your question is that most of those
people aren't coming. If they are coming, they're coming in small
numbers, and they tend to come in at regular admissions borders.
They are far enough away; they have other places to go. If they do
decide to come here, it's a pretty long and difficult journey.
Your question raises another point: One of the problems we
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have in all these cases is that the federal government doesn't always find it convenient to live with case-by-case review. It's difficult in these mass asylum situations. So what we have happening,
and I think it is unfortunate, is statements made by people in the
administration in high positions, that certain groups are not refugees-for example, the Haitians. Now, this administration has
stated again and again-as have people in the last administration-that "there are no political refugees from Haiti. There is no
repression in Haiti. Haiti is fine." I don't think that is honest, and
I don't think that's exactly true in every case. It may be true in
ninety percent or sixty percent of the cases. We may differ about
the numbers, but we've got to stick with a case-by-case evaluation.
If we do that, I think the way to get the system away from this
political world that it's operating in and these old conceptions
about communists and noncommunists is simply to allow the system to operate as it does, on the case-by-case basis, and not to
have policy come down from "Mount High" saying, "For this
group of 6,000, nobody is going to get asylum, because there is no
persecution in country X."
Audience Member: I'd like to address this question to Professor Chiswick. It's been argued that the solution to the illegal
immigration problem is not to be found in more vigorous enforcement of the immigration laws, but rather in assisting unendowed
countries in eradicating poverty. Would you advocate substantially
increased U.S. aid to Haiti, and if so, how can you ensure that the
aid can reach the needy or go to the development of the Haitian
economy?
Professor Chiswick: That's a very good question; I'm glad
the issue of foreign aid came up. Actually, foreign aid can sometimes have the reverse effect, that of encouraging flight from a
country. Take a country in which the people are very poor-so
poor that they don't have the resources to leave. That's probably
the case for most Haitians. With some minimal level of development, they now have some resources to finance leaving the country.
Therefore, foreign aid may not be a solution to flight from a country and may in fact increase it. Some studies have shown that to be
the case.
In general, it's not clear that foreign aid has been helpful to
the recipient countries. Many of the countries have dissipated the
resources through corruption. Others have used the resources for
projects that are counterproductive. Many less-developed countries
have used the foreign aid to construct capital-intensive industries,
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whereas what's needed for development would be labor-intensive
industries. Many of these countries have used the foreign aid to
increase their political domination over the. population, rather than
for development. I'm not a great fan of the effects of foreign aid.
Professor Swan: I think we're coming to the end of the
hour now. I'll take one more question.
Audience Member: It was mentioned earlier that one of the
alternatives that the United States has to its immigration
problems is the transfer of refugees to other countries. How realistic is it to think that these other countries will be receptive to such
a policy, especially in light of Puerto Rico's response to the transfer of the Mariel refugees?
Mr. Posner: I'll give you one example, and it's not a major
one: I think there is interest among several French-speaking governments, including Quebec and France, in taking some of the Haitians. I don't know how far that's gotten. I think they want to find
people with relatives in those countries. But we must explore those
possibilities. One of the ways we can use our diplomatic and economic influence with regard to Spanish-speaking entrants, is to try
to get some of our Latin American allies to take some of the burden. There are big countries, not poor countries, in Latin America
that are our friends, and they haven't been doing what they can.
The same thing is true in Southeast Asia. I don't want to overstate
or to be overly optimistic about that. I recognize that it is a real
problem to find governments that are as willing as we've been to
take large numbers of people. I think that's a truism. We need to
truly internationalize the process. By that I mean, go into the U.N.
and get the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees involved institutionally, and try to create a system where we're not
only asking people to take, but where we're willing to give, and
where we're willing to take international advice and to treat it seriously. I think we've been willing to throw the problem out and to
say, "Well, we've done our share, now you do yours." But we haven't been willing to bring in the UNHCR and use their more formal ways of trying to resolve some of these problems. Ultimately,
we must do that.
Professor Scanlan: Just a couple of points. First, I really
don't think that the Puerto Rican situation is a terribly good analogy, simply because the Puerto Ricans to some extent regarded-and quite rightly so-the mainland as taking advantage of
the colonial status of the island in attempting to dispose of a politically embarrasing problem here, which is not at all analogous to
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what happens in our dealings with other countries. Nonetheless, I
think that the trends generally are not very propitious in terms of
expecting that there will be a great deal of additional support
forthcoming from other countries, although I agree with Mr. Posner that that's a goal we very definitely must pursue.
When the Cubans came from the Peruvian embassy in 1980,
for example, only about half of the original 10,000 received firm
commitments for acceptance from other countries in the world. On
the other hand, in the situation of the Vietnamese "boat people,"
the international commitment was much, much larger. I don't
think you can generalize. I think it depends a little bit on what
group you're talking about and on how it attracts the world's attention. But I'm not very hopeful about it.
Professor Chiswick: Even though I was the one who raised
that question earlier today, I do recognize that there is a problem
in convincing other countries to accept refugees. Japan is a good
example. Japan took in fewer than a hundred Vietnamese "boat
people" and claimed that taking in any more would destabilize
their homogeneous population of 100 million, which must mean
that either these Vietnamese are far more powerful than anybody
had envisioned [laughter] or that the Japanese culture is extremely
fragile. Although there has been a lot of criticism of American policy regarding refugees and suggestion that it's racist-some countries are far more so. Actually, most countries are far more racist
than we are in their immigration policies.
Professor Swan: I want to thank everybody for coming, and
I do want to thank the panel.

